Microsoft font subsetting dll heapbased outofbounds read in writetablefromstructure Vulnerability / Exploit
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Exploits / Vulnerability Discovered : 2019-08-15 |
Type : dos |
Platform : windows
This exploit / vulnerability Microsoft font subsetting dll heapbased outofbounds read in writetablefromstructure is for educational purposes only and if it is used you will do on your own risk!
[+] Code ...
-----=====[ Background ]=====-----
The Microsoft Font Subsetting DLL (fontsub.dll) is a default Windows helper library for subsetting TTF fonts; i.e. converting fonts to their more compact versions based on the specific glyphs used in the document where the fonts are embedded. It is used by Windows GDI and Direct2D, and parts of the same code are also found in the t2embed.dll library designed to load and process embedded fonts.
The DLL exposes two API functions: CreateFontPackage and MergeFontPackage. We have developed a testing harness which invokes a pseudo-random sequence of such calls with a chosen font file passed as input. This report describes a crash triggered by a malformed font file in the fontsub.dll code through our harness.
-----=====[ Description ]=====-----
We have encountered the following crash in fontsub!WriteTableFromStructure:
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(3890.25ac): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
FONTSUB!WriteTableFromStructure+0x6e:
00007fff`aa544326 0fb74810 movzx ecx,word ptr [rax+10h] ds:000001ac`2d48a000=????
The root cause of the crash seems to be the fact that the MergeEblcEbdtTables() function may allocate a 0-sized buffer and pass it to WriteTableFromStructure() as one of the fields of a structure passed through the fifth argument, but the WriteTableFromStructure() function assumes that the buffer is at least 32 bytes long, and unconditionally reads from it at offset 16, and other offsets later on in the routine.
The issue reproduces on a fully updated Windows 10 1709; we haven't tested earlier versions of the system. It could be potentially used to disclose sensitive data from the process address space. It is easiest to reproduce with PageHeap enabled, but it is also possible to observe a crash in a default system configuration. Attached are 3 proof of concept malformed font files which trigger the crash.
Proof of Concept:
https://github.com/offensive-security/exploitdb-bin-sploits/raw/master/bin-sploits/47267.zip
Microsoft font subsetting dll heapbased outofbounds read in writetablefromstructure