An issue was discovered on NOKIA Airscale ASIKA Single RAN devices before 21B. Nokia Single RAN commissioning procedures do not change (factory-time installed) default SSH public/private key values that are specific to a network operator. As a result, the CSP internal BTS network SSH server (disabled by default) continues to apply the default SSH public/private key values. These keys don\'t give access to BTS, because service user authentication is username/password-based on top of SSH. Nokia factory installed default SSH keys are meant to be changed from operator-specific values during the BTS deployment commissioning phase. However, before the 21B release, BTS commissioning manuals did not provide instructions to change default SSH keys (to BTS operator-specific values). This leads to a possibility for malicious operations staff (inside a CSP network) to attempt MITM exploitation of BTS service user access, during the moments that SSH is enabled for Nokia service personnel to perform troubleshooting activities.
Metrics
CVSS Version: 3.1 |
Base Score: 6.3 MEDIUM Vector: CVSS:3.1/AC:H/AV:L/A:H/C:H/I:H/PR:H/S:U/UI:R
l➤ Exploitability Metrics: Attack Vector (AV)* LOCAL Attack Complexity (AC)* HIGH Privileges Required (PR)* HIGH User Interaction (UI)* REQUIRED Scope (S)* UNCHANGED
l➤ Impact Metrics: Confidentiality Impact (C)* HIGH Integrity Impact (I)* HIGH Availability Impact (A)* HIGH
Weakness Enumeration (CWE)
CWE-ID: CWE Name: n/a Source: n/a
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)