Comodo Hack Highlights Chinks In Net Infrastructure

The certificate authoritys issuance of valid certs to a supposedly Iranian hacker causes experts to question the capability of the certificate infrastructure to respond to attacks

A self-described 21-year-old Iranian hackers ability to get high-value security certificates issued by Comodo might have little impact on the security of most companies and consumers. Yet the reverberations will certainly be felt throughout the Internets infrastructure, security experts say.
On Tuesday, Comodo CTO Robin Alden
acknowledged
that two other registration authorities -- the companies that vet requests for certificates -- had suffered compromises. Along with the original company, InstantSSL.it (part of GlobalTrust), the two registration authorities had their privileges suspended by Comodo, which has already worked with browser makers to revoke the certificates.
Along with
the recent attack on security firm RSA
, which warned earlier this month that its systems had also been breached and information stolen that could weaken SecurID, its widely used one-time-password technology, the Comodo scam highlights major problems with the underpinning of Internet security, says Anup Ghosh, founder and chief scientist for browser security firm Invincea.
In the context of RSA and in the context of Comodo, what you are looking at are attacks against fundamental security infrastructure, Ghosh says. What this attack illustrates is that the faith in that foundation has been shaken.
The attack
calls into question
the ability of certificate authorities to accurately check the identity of persons requesting a certificate. The Comodo hacker requested certificates for major domains, such as Microsofts Live and Googles Gmail, almost guaranteeing that the requests would be noticed, says Paul Mutton, security researcher with network monitoring firm Netcraft.
The attacker has gone after what looks like the weaker points of the security chain here, Mutton says. It makes you wonder, if it wasnt a high-value target ... would it have been noticed? Are there already certificates out there that have been fraudulently obtained and havent been detected?
The hacker has published five posts on Pastebin regarding the attack,
claiming
to have breached a registration authoritys security through an SQL injection attack. He then expanded his beachhead on the server by exploiting a privilege escalation flaw. The attacker offered the private key to the fraudulently obtained Mozilla certificate as proof of his claims. Several researchers have already confirmed that the private key is valid.
It took me time, I hacked a lot of resellers, but I found out that most of the CAs verify customers in their own way, the attacker wrote. After a lot of research and talking as a customer to CAs, I found out there is possible potential in Comodo, I saw resellers cant verify customers, but Comodo partners can.
To its credit, Comodo took immediate steps to revoke certificates. The company discovered that two other registration authorities (RAs) were also compromised.
We are rolling out improved authentication for all RA accounts, Robin Alden, Comodos chief technology officer,
wrote in a post
on Tuesday on mozilla.dev.security.policy. We are implementing both IP address restriction and hardware-based two-factor authentication.
The company plans to manually verify all requested certificates until the new security measures are rolled out, according to Alden.
While the capability of the attacker to succeed in the attack is disturbing, the problems in revoking the certificates -- and showing that revocation to the user through effective user-interface design -- is, perhaps, more threatening. The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP), which allows browsers to check the revocation status of a certificate in real time, fails nearly invisibly on Microsofts Internet Explorer and without any significant warning on Mozillas Firefox, according to Adam Langley, a security engineer at Google.
If the attacker is close to the user (say, on a cafes wireless network), then they can only attack a smaller number of users, but they can intercept traffic to the CA and thus defeat revocation, Langley
wrote on his blog
.
Its an assertion with which the ComodoHacker seems to agree.
I reversed the protocol, re-wrote response, created a code which returned my fake OCSP response, so [that the] browser never thinks certificates are revoked, he wrote in an e-mail interview with DarkReading. OCSP protocol is useless.
One solution to revocation is to stop doing it altogether, Langley says. Instead, companies could use certificates that are good for only a few days. Instead of revoking a bad certificate, companies would just have to stop renewing the certificate.
Clients wouldnt have to perform revocation checks, which are very complex and slow, CAs wouldnt have to pay for massive, DDoS proof serving capacity, and revocation would actually work, Googles Langley writes.
Have a comment on this story? Please click Add Your Comment below. If youd like to contact
Dark Readings
editors directly,
send us a message
.

Last News
▸ ArcSight prepares for future at user conference post HP acquisition. ◂ Discovered: 07/01/2025 Category: security	▸ Samsung Epic 4G: First To Use Media Hub ◂ Discovered: 07/01/2025 Category: security	▸ Many third-party software fails security tests ◂ Discovered: 07/01/2025 Category: security

**Cyber Security Categories**
Google Dorks Database	Exploits Vulnerability	Exploit Shellcodes

CVE List

Tools/Apps

News/Aarticles

Phishing Database

Deepfake Detection

Trends/Statistics & Live Infos

Tags:
Comodo Hack Highlights Chinks In Net Infrastructure